As a probable counterweight, the Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, announced on October 6 that four people have been arrested while attempting to conduct subversive activity in one of Iran’s nuclear sites. He accused un-named countries, which, he said, “think that they can use sabotage to hinder nuclear talks with the West.” Salehi provided no further details.

Although some media organizations were quick to describe Mansouri as a spy, it seems that he’s not exactly worthy of the title. He visited Israel three times using his Belgian passport, obtained through marriage to a Belgian national. He rented a hotel room with a balcony facing the American Embassy in Tel Aviv and took photos. He also took photos of the arrival hall at the Ben Gurion airport. These activities could hardly be labeled espionage. So why was Mansouri arrested? Because, legally, it’s not the quality of the intelligence he was gathering but the criminal intent. Otherwise all clumsy spies would get off the hook. The value of the intelligence, if at all, is measured during sentencing. There’s no doubt that Mansouri was a potential risk, and it is credible that he could have posed a serious security risk for Israel.

Mansouri appeared to be using clandestine methods. According to the indictment, he entered Israel three times, each from a different European country. He presented himself to Israelis as a Belgian businessman selling glass for “European Folded Glass System,” probably a shell corporation established by Iranian Intelligence. The indictment further alleges that during his investigation, Mansouri’s handlers instructed him to establish a seemingly legitimate business infrastructure for Iran’s agents to use in espionage and sabotage operations. They also instructed him to seek information about business incorporation, and to survey the local needs for pneumatic tools. According to the indictment, Mansouri, when debriefed by his Iranian handlers, also reported his findings on the passenger screening process at Ben Gurion Airport. The report also alleges Mansouri travelled to a sensitive security installation in Israel and took photos there.

Mansouri was born in Iran. But he spent most of the last 30 years in Turkey and Belgium. He told his Israeli interrogators that when he visited Iran in 2007, he attracted the attention of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence and special operations unit. An Iranian national with a name changed to one that sounded European, a European passport, and with no apparent contact with Iran, could become an intelligence nugget. Mansouri claimed that he was coerced to become a spy. However, judging from the information available publicly thus far, much more credit should be given to the Iranian intelligence services — they are not that stupid or simplistic. Although Mansouri admitted being dispatched by Iran to Israel, his mission could have been a test balloon: testing the Israeli counterintelligence services’ alertness. There’s no need to be a rocket scientist — or ,in this case, an intelligence analyst — to predict that Manouri’s mission was likely to fail. His Belgian passport showed that he was born in Iran. In and by itself, that’s no reason to raise a suspecting brow. But when he came several times to Israel, each time from a different country, suspecting brows went up. One of the first things done under these circumstances is to check the bona fides of the person of interest. This would take just a quick search in the huge databases of the Israeli intelligence community; an inquiry to the Belgian security services for background information; and checking the website used by Mansouri and whether there’s a real company behind it. If the results warranted, he’d be flagged at the border during his next entry, and he’d grow a motorcade tail courtesy of Israeli counterintelligence agents. The rest is just as obvious. He’s arrested; a search of his camera shows photos he took of the American Embassy and the airport; handcuffs; two weeks of interrogation when he spilled out his mission; and soon, an appearance before a Magistrate and indictment.

Why did the Iranians bother? They are much more sophisticated than that. They would never send a professional spy to Israel bearing a passport that gave his birthplace as Iran. A professional spy would not keep incriminating photos in his camera, but would dispatch them and erase the memory card. A spy worthy of his title would establish himself as a law abiding resident; start a business; make contacts; and refrain from any suspicious activities such as taking photos of sensitive areas. Realistically, what intelligence achievements could a tourist with an Iranian accent make during several short visits to security-minded Israel? Identify strategic areas for attack? There’s no need to risk sending an operative. Just watching Israeli TV or reading the newspapers would provide ample information. Incorporating in Israel? Read the website of the Ministry of Justice.

So why was Mansouri sent? One reason could be a security breach on the Iranian end: a suspicion that Israel had planted within the Iranian intelligence services an agent informing Israel of forthcoming espionage operations. To catch the culprit, Iran might plan an operation using a scapegoat that could easily be sacrificed, and make sure that the suspected Israeli agent within their organization — but no one else — was made aware of the operation. If Israel caught the unsuspecting Iranian traveler, then it could lead to the planted Israeli agent in Iran. But Israeli security is sophisticated, too. An Israeli agent planted in Iranian intelligence would scarcely be needed to bring Mansouri to Israel’s attention.

Bottom line: unless this operation was planned by a clumsy and unsupervised Iranian intelligence officer, now behind bars in Tehran, this operation must have had purposes other than traditional espionage.

If true — and the public is unlikely to find out any time soon — then Turkey breached one of the fundamental unwritten rules of ethics in the lawless no-rules game of espionage: do not betray your fellow cooperating intelligence service, because it will haunt you and damage your own interests with all other intelligence services. Turkey’s alleged conduct can be condemned, but understood, because in the cesspool of the covert intelligence war, there are no long-term loyalties, only immediate interests — and Turkey probably had overriding interests strong enough to risk the price it will have to pay for their disloyalty.

Intelligence is traded between countries’ intelligence services just like commodities are traded in the world markets. They trade information for other information or take “a credit slip” for future exchanges.

Although it is common practice among intelligence services to trade information, steps are taken to protect sources and methods used to obtain the information. Rarely are actual secret documents shared for fear that hidden markers would reveal who had original access to the documents. For example: If there are 10 copies of the same intelligence report distributed within a country’s government — each copy has a minuscule change from the others, perhaps just a comma in a different location in the text. Therefore, that risk exists even when redacted documents are sent. Instead, the transferring organization usually prepares a synopsis of the document before it is released to the receiving intelligence organization.

The same elaborate security minded procedures are applied when intelligence agents meet their “assets.” That is particularly true when the meetings are held in countries with suspect loyalty towards the visiting agents’ country. That could have happened with the case at hand. What appears to have happened is that the Israeli Mossad case officers — probably no more than two or three at the time plus back up security — met near the Turkish-Iranian border with their “assets” who had crossed the mountains between the countries. In my fictional intelligence thriller The Chameleon Conspiracy there is a detailed description how a CIA/Mossad agent escaped from Iran to Turkey using the same route. It is not known whether the alleged meeting between the Mossad agents and the “assets” was held with the knowledge of the Turkish intelligence service, Milli Istihbarat Teskilati, or MIT, because Israel could share intelligence, but never operational activities. However, even without MIT’s nod, there’s no doubt that its agents are monitoring the towns nearby the Iranian border, and any strange face gets immediate attention.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the Washington Post’s report; first, whoever leaked them the information, probably a Western intelligence agency, used the credibility of the newspaper to shoot a salvo across the Turkish intelligence agency’s bow: Hey, MIT, you did something that is just not done. And our long organizational memory will teach us to be wary of you next time you want to exchange intelligence information.

Indeed, Turkey immediately protested the article describing it “as part of an attempt to discredit Turkey by foreign powers uncomfortable with its growing influence in the Middle East.”

The second conclusion is that Mossad Israeli case officers preferred not to enter Iran and held face-to-face debriefing rendezvous with their “assets” outside Iran, fearing that any other mode of communication, such as electronic, is less reliable. Who were these assets? Definitely not Israelis, perhaps members of an ethnic minority with an agenda — Kurds, Bahá’í, or Balochs — discriminated Sunni Muslims in Shiite Iran.

In the murky world of international espionage, multiple layers of secrecy, subterfuge and treachery are not the exception. They are the rule.

Mustafa Taleb, in actuality, returned to Israel as his real self, Massoud Bouton, as a result of the decision made by Israel’s Intelligence Unit to end his spy career without compensation because of a disagreement with his bosses.

Bouton’s story is told by a former Shabak (Israel’s Internal Security Service) officer in his newly-released book An Intelligence Agent’s Story. He met with Bouton for hours to gather the details of his life of espionage, which began in 1956 and spanned seven years as he operated in Beirut and Damascus. As Mustafa Taleb, Bouton created a vast network through which he used to collect intelligence. He used a special communication device to relay his information to Tel Aviv. The author wrote this book to clear Bouton’s defamed reputation ensuing from being fired. Bouton died last year.

Lebanon’s military court handed down a death sentence on Monday, June 20th on Bassam Abu Jawdeh, a Lebanese merchant found guilty of espionage. The conviction was for working for Israeli intelligence and supplying them with information. Death penalty is imposed in Lebanon when an operative’s actions result in Lebanese life being lost. The death sentence is subject to the consent of the president, prime minister and justice minister. A request for the death penalty by the military tribunal at the beginning of this year concerned six Lebanese convicted of collaboration with the Israelis and indirectly causing the deaths of a number of Hezbollah militants.

The Lebanese Army has made more than 150 arrests since its clampdown on alleged spies began in 2007 and among those arrested were prominent military officials and telecommunications staff believed to be Israeli operatives. A recent case that has drawn great attention is that of one-time General Fayez Karam, a high ranking member of the Free Patriotic Movement, whose conviction on charges of collaboration with the Israelis brings with it a probable sentence of three to 15 years at hard labor. Another high profile case involves Col. Antoine Abu Jaoude, who is now on trial on charges of collaboration with the Israelis, by providing the Israeli Mossad with names and addresses of Lebanese Army and Hezbollah officials. A conviction could mean a death sentence by reason of treason.

The arrested Palestinian was a resident of the Bourj A-Shimali refugee camp in southern Lebanon. He has supposedly been supplying Israel with information for the past five years. Officials who raided his home reported finding advanced communications and spy equipment, used for gathering information and sending it to Israeli forces.

A Lebanese newspaper also reported the arrest of three other suspected spies, all allegedly part of a spy ring in collaboration with Israel. There are no current details on their arrests, so be sure to keep an eye out for an update!

It is believed by many that Stuxnet was made specifically with the intention of sabotaging Iranian nuclear operations, and several accusatory fingers have been pointed Israel’s way, but Moslehi’s announcement seems to hold European countries and/or the U.S. accountable for the virus as well.

Stuxnet did indeed infect hundreds of the computers helping to keep Bushehr, Iran’s first nuclear power plant, humming, resulting in a lot of damage control necessary on the part of the Iranians. Even though the plant’s official launch ceremony was held on August 21, 2010, it seems that Bushehr’s ability to generate power and electricity has been severely compromised and its true launch delayed.

Moslehi, however, has reported that appropriate counter measures to the worm have been developed and implemented: “I assure all citizens that the intelligence apparatus currently has complete supervision on cyberspace and will not allow any leak or destruction of our country’s nuclear activities… Our domination of virtual networks has thwarted the activities of enemies in this regard.”

Like anything coming out of the mouths of Iranian leadership, Moslehi’s words cannot be taken at face value. Complete supervision on cyberspace? Domination of virtual networks? Seems hard to believe given the cyberspace sprawl and the mega attack recently suffered.

The identity of the arrested “spies” is unknown. Are they really spies, or just more hikers, nabbed under the ‘spy’ pretense, so they can be used as bargaining chips later on? Perhaps they are simply Iranians who disagree with the autocratic methods of their government. Any excuse for a crack-down.

Either way, Iran believes it has been the target of electronic warfare, and fully intends to up its defenses. Are the U.S. and Europe on the offensive?

The worm operates by infecting SCADA systems (that monitor and control industrial processes), reprogramming critical systemic elements and hiding these changes. It exploits no fewer than four Microsoft software vulnerabilities (way more than the standard one, if any) and is originally transferred by means of a USB memory stick/flash drive. Half a megabyte in size and written in more than one programming language, the worm is unusually large and sophisticated.

Various computer experts and analysts who have studied the worm intensely since it was detected four months ago have commented on Stuxnet’s unmatched sophistication, agreeing that the team behind it likely had the financial backing and support of a very technically advanced nation state. The first known worm designed to attack real-world infrastructure (think power stations, water plants, industrial units), the malware has been called out and out “scary.” Technical journals like PC World, Computerworld and CNET all seem to be in agreement that this is not the work of private computer geeks or rogue hackers. One expert told Wired magazine, that the code for Stuxnet would have literally taken many months if not years to write.

So why the leap from technically advanced nation state to Israel v. Iran? First, the majority of the computers affected by the worm, and the only servers known to have been severely damaged by it, are located in Iran. Iran happens to be the site of some extremely controversial, i.e. nuclear, industrial processes. Although Iran claims that its nuclear development is for civil purposes only, Iran’s President, Ahmadinejad, isn’t exactly shy about his beliefs that the Holocaust didn’t occur and that Israel should not exist. Israel, on the other hand, has the perfect mix of technical advancement, intelligence expertise and justified apprehension to want to throw a major spanner in Iran’s steadily progressing nuclear works.

According to Debkafile, US and UN nuclear watchdogs have reported since August a slowdown in Iranian nuclear enrichment due to technical difficulties. Apparently at the centrifuge facility in Natanz alone, three thousand centrifuges are out of commission. Natanz, in addition to the Bushehr nuclear plant, are both on the list of speculated Stuxnet targets.

There is no hard evidence to date regarding the origin and specific industrial target of Stuxnet. In addition to infecting Iranian computers, it seems to have wormed its way into German, Indian and Indonesian computers as well. Then again, if the Israel v. Iran speculations are true, a few false leads are to be expected…

According to Le Monde Diplomatique, Urim base is located just under 20 miles away from the Beersheva prison, in the Negev desert. The installation quietly, thoroughly and systematically gathers intelligence across the Middle East, Europe, Africa and Asia. With its neatly arranged rows of variously-sized satellite dishes, the base intercepts all means of communications, from phone and email to maritime signals.

The expansive surveillance base, a mile or so north of the Urim kibbutz, is a high-capacity intelligence-gathering hub. The intel gathered therein is used to keep a close watch on governments, organizations, companies and individuals, to monitor the already suspicious and to discover new potential threats. Israel is well-known for the strength of its military, its possession of nuclear weapons and its top notch covert operations, but it is the Urim base that keeps Israel’s ear to the ground, and makes sure that its various security and defense operations are properly informed.

Originally developed decades ago to pick up telephone communications alone (Intelsat), the base’s technology was expanded to intercept maritime communications as well (Inmarsat). It also plugs into other regional satellites, undersea cables and Israeli embassy buildings, creating a network that increases its catchment area. It likely picked up on the communications made by the Gaza ‘aid’ flotilla workers long before the ships began approaching the maritime blockade line.

Of course, gathered data on its own is meaningless – it needs to be deciphered by the analysts over at Unit 8200. In the words of President Obama, the dots need to be connected. Unit 8200 is the body responsible for Israeli signals intelligence. Based in Herzeliya, north of Tel Aviv, Unit 8200 gives meaning to the signals identified at Urim as non-routine, and then passes on the meaningful intelligence to bodies like the military and the Mossad.

Urim targets both enemy and ally nations. With about 30 antennas, it is one of the biggest bases of its kind. Other countries, including the US, the UK and France, have their own bases dedicated to eavesdropping on worldwide communications, but they have been known about for years, whereas Urim has just been discovered…

As reported earlier, Germany wanted Brodsky for his connection to the January 2010 assassination of important Hamas figure Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai. It is believed that Brodsky, who was working in Germany at the time under the name of Alexander Werin, supplied Mossad agents with some of the forged passports they used to enter Dubai unnoticed and carry out their mission.

As soon as Brodsky was arrested in Poland, German officials called for his extradition. Despite Israel’s request to Poland and Germany – Israel being on good terms with both – to stop proceedings, Germany held firm. Prosecutors involved in the case insisted that the illegal use of official German documents in an assassination operation called for trial.

However, instead of facing the expected espionage charges in Cologne, Germany, Brodsky seems to have been let off with a slap on the wrist. The morning after his extradition to Germany on August 12, his trial for the forgery of official documents – which carries a significantly lighter maximum sentence of three years in prison – began with his release. Release on bail that is. Brodsky quickly made his way back to Israel, while Dubai officials protested, demanding Germany explain why it had released on bail a suspect in a murder case.

Israeli sources say that Brodsky will be represented in court by his attorneys – naturally. In Germany, a court official explained to reporters that “[t]he matter can now be dealt with by written proceedings.”

In June 2007 Ashraf Marwan, an Egyptian businessman, fell to his death from the balcony of his London apartment.

Did he fall, jump or get a push? These questions have lingered for the past three years and remain unanswered. If he was murdered, then his death could help us figure out whether Marwan was a loyal Israeli spy, a double Egyptian-Israeli spy or a spy with shifting loyalties.

Marwan was a son-in-law of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and a close aide to Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat. Israeli sources labeled him as the best Israeli spy ever, one who gave Israel an early warning of the break of the October 1973 war with Egypt. At the same time, he was accused by Israel’s former chief of military intelligence General Eli Zeira of being an Egyptian agent controlled by Egypt, pretending to be a spy to deceive Israel.

With two conflicting accounts regarding Marwan’s loyalty, it’s little wonder that there are multiple assumptions about how he died. If he was indeed a victim of foul play, who pushed him?

Was Marwan killed by Israeli Mossad agents attempting to prevent the publication of his memoirs, which vanished from the apartment when his death was discovered? Or maybe the assassins were Egyptian agents avenging Marwan’s alleged betrayal (if he was indeed serving Israel only)? Perhaps the assassins were unrelated to Marwan’s distant past, and his death related to his immediate past of arms deals and other businesses, including an association with Libya’s president Muammar Khadafy? Conspiracy theories aside, is it also plausible that Marwan’s death was mere accident or even suicide?

Can Marwan’s personal history shed light on his loyalties?

After completing a degree in chemistry in 1965, he joined the Egyptian Army and in 1966, he married Mona, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s third daughter. After a short stint in a junior position in the presidential press office, Marwan went to London to obtain an advanced degree in chemistry. There, he was rumored to have had a romance with the wife of a wealthy Kuwaiti sheik, who sponsored Marwan’s lavish lifestyle. President Nasser discovered the affair, ordered him back to Egypt and asked his daughter to divorce him. She refused. Back in Egypt, although Marwan managed to have his father-in-law, President Nasser, give him a few political assignments, Marwan never held a top position in Nasser’s regime.

In the spring of 1969, Marwan became a “walk in” spy for Israel. He approached the Israeli embassy in London and offered his clandestine services. After being rejected twice for fear of a trap, he was finally recruited. Included in the Israeli Mossad’s assessment of Marwan’s motives was the fact that he was greedy. He demanded $100,000 for each contact he made with Israel; on the other hand, he expressed disillusionment with his country. It is not farfetched to assume that Marwan was also bitter that President Nasser had not appointed him to high government positions.

As is usual in the case of walk-ins, the Mossad demanded that Marwan prove his new loyalty. And indeed, Marwan provided the Mossad with the record made of President Nasser’s secret visit to the Soviet Union on January 22, 1970, during which the president sought a Soviet supply of fighter jets. Then, President Nasser suddenly died in September 1970, of a heart attack at the age of 52, without having had a known history of cardiac ailments. Marwan’s career in the Egyptian government flourished when President Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser, leaving behind Ali Sabri, another contender to the presidency.

An intriguing coincidence – or not – is the fact that at Nasser’s funeral, both Anwar Sadat and Ali Sabri suffered heart attacks, which they survived. Was a heart attack ever recognized as a contagious disease?

Was there a conspiracy against President Nasser that ended with his sudden death, bringing Sadat to power with Marwan, his informant? In 2008, an Egyptian court in South Cairo rendered a judgment in favor of Ruqaya Sadat, daughter of late President Anwar Sadat, brought against Dr. Hoda Abdel Nasser, the daughter of Sadat’s predecessor. The judgment was for 150,000 Egyptian pounds, for slandering Sadat by accusing him of masterminding a plan to kill Gamal Abdel Nasser in order to succeed him.

In 1971, Marwan secretly informed President Sadat on Ali Sabri, a former head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, and former vice president, who was planning a coup together with others including Marwan’s immediate boss, Minister for Presidential Affairs Sami Sharaf. President Sadat gratefully gave Sharaf’s job to Marwan, which gave Marwan access to classified information.

Over the years, the secret information Marwan passed Israel included a report on the delivery to Egypt of Soviet Scud missiles, a report on a terrorist plan to attack an El Al plane in Rome and valuable information regarding Sadat’s meetings with Arab leaders.

However, the feather in Marwan’s hat from the Israeli perspective was his warning, 40 hours before Egypt and Syria’s sudden attack on Israel on Yom Kippur of 1973. In fact, Marwan was off only by a few hours.

The unprecedented claim, made by General Zeira in a press interview, that Marwan was a double agent was interpreted by many to create an alibi for Zeira for his failure to act on earlier warnings prior to the break of the 1973 war. He was accused of adhering to the “concept” that Egypt would not attack Israel until it obtained sufficient military power (which per Zeira’s assessment, was still inadequate), thereby ignoring warning signs. General Zvi Zamir, head of the Mossad during the Yom Kippur War and the personal recipient of the alert from Marwan 40 hours before the Egyptian attack, accused General Zeira of leaking top-secret information, and filed a criminal complaint against Zeira. In return, General Zeira filed, in 2005, a libel lawsuit against General Zamir. The case was removed to arbitration before the former deputy chief justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, Theodore Orr. In his judgment, Justice Orr accepted General Zamir’s version that Marwan had not doubled.

Was Marwan a double agent? On one hand, he gave Israel extremely valuable information that proved accurate. On the other hand, the fact that he volunteered in 1969 to serve Israel without being approached first is suspicious. It is a known fact that most embassies of certain countries are constantly observed from the outside. Israel’s embassy in London is probably not an exception. Furthermore, on October 6, 2004, when Egypt commemorated the October 1973 War, Marwan was viewed on Egyptian television shaking the hand of President Mubarak while they laid a wreath on Nasser’s tomb. This could indicate that Egypt does not consider Marwan a traitor, but rather a loyal Egyptian who managed to double-cross Israel.

Marwan’s wife insisted that he was murdered by Mossad agents and caused the British authorities to reopen the case. After hearing evidence and conducting an investigation, a British coroner, William Dolman, issued today an open verdict saying that there was no evidence to support allegations of murder. He added, “We simply don’t know the facts, despite careful investigation.”

The saga and mystery are unlikely to be put to rest, unless intelligence files become public. And that will not happen in our lifetime.

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 7/14/2010

It seems very likely that Qazzi gave up Raba’s name during interrogation by Lebanese security and intelligence agents, even though authorities in Lebanon have declined to comment on this point.

They have, however, described Raba as even more of a threat to Lebanon than Qazzi was, who allegedly gave Israel access to the entire company. With this level of access, the Israeli Mossad could reportedly monitor and trace all mobile phone users. Qazzi is also accused of allowing Israel to infect Lebanese communication systems with viruses to paralyze the system and delete entire files of data from it. Of course, this leaves us wondering how Raba could possibly have been “more dangerous.”

Raba, 40, started working for Alfa in 1996 and is accused of spying for Israel since 2001, which upped his income by at least $20,000 a month. A local newspaper reported that he had access to all sorts of confidential technical details, including transmitter locations.

Since April of 2009, Lebanon has made a string of spy arrests. Over 50 Lebanese and Palestinians living in Lebanon have been accused of operating on behalf of Israel, specifically helping Israel to identify targets during the 2006 war with the terrorist group Hezbollah, which is based in Lebanon.

Israel has not commented on the arrests, but Lebanon’s beginning to wonder just how far Israel has managed to infiltrate given that the telecoms companies are so closely connected to and monitored by the government. On the other hand, Lebanon feels its arrests over the past 15 months are sending the right warning signals to Israeli spies and are making dents in Israel’s intelligence pipeline. Furthermore, it seems that Lebanese authorities concur that those convicted of spying for Israel should be sentenced to death.

While the government is busy sending harsh messages, the telecommunications ministry is trying to plug up the leaks in its industry. Apparently a third telecoms spy has been arrested, though details of his identity are not yet available, and a fourth spy fled to Israel to escape arrest.

Did Brigadier-General Mehdi Moini, who commands Iran’s Islamic Revolution’s Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Iranian West Azerbaijan province, fail to read events through, or was he conducting psychological counter-warfare? Moini was interviewed by the Iranian television channel Press TV, following media reports on the presence of American and Israeli forces in Azerbaijan along the borders of his province in northwest Iran. In that region, Iran has a 550-mile border with Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Moini said that IRGC mobilized its troops in the area and that his forces’ move has frustrated the enemy’s attempts to destabilize the western Iranian province. Moini claimed that while the enemy was damaged in the course of his movements, no Iranian base was compromised. Moini failed to identify the enemy, but claimed, “Certain Western countries” are muddying the water in Azerbaijan “by provoking ethnic and religious strife in the region and inciting terrorist groups, they seek to destabilize our province.”

Ethnic and religious strife? Really?

Is the real reason for the rumored presence of U.S. forces in Azerbaijan, “to destabilize western Iran?” Is General Moini reading his maps correctly? It would be interesting to hear his explanation about the reported concentration of U.S. forces, and its allies’ warships, in the Persian Gulf, near Iran’s southern borders, more than a thousand miles away from his province. Would he call it “a fishing expedition?”

Is General Moini that naive?

King Solomon, the wisest of all men, said in Proverbs 27:22, “Though thou shouldest bray a fool in a mortar with a pestle among groats, yet will not his foolishness depart from him.”

The Jewish Sages offer an interpretation of the verse: Although the fool acknowledges that he’s being ground in the mortar, he claims that the hulled grains around him are the target of the pestle, while he just happens to be there.

Since neither Moini nor his employers are fools, his remarks can be interpreted as a response in-kind to what Iran sees as psychological warfare, rather than a genuine threat.

Whether Iran misreads what the naked eye can see, or says one thing while readying itself for a military clash, if the reports on troop concentration in southern and northwestern Iran are accurate, then they reflect a serious and ominous step toward a potential military confrontation with Iran.

The rapid deterioration of U.S. and NATO relations with Turkey accelerated its pace when news about troops’ concentration in Azerbaijan started developing. Has Azerbaijan’s choice demonstrated the U.S.’s increased concern that Turkey is turning east toward Iran and therefore cannot be relied upon should U.S.-Iran hostilities commence?

There is no doubt that the region is simmering. Recently, there were separate visits to Israel by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Leon Panetta and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Arab sources claimed that the meetings in Israel focused on Iran’s nuclear program. Did these visits and the concentration of troops imply preparations for an imminent military confrontation with Iran? U.S. government officials routinely deny any current U.S. plans to attack Iran, but should the Iranians believe U.S. declarations or read their own intelligence reports regarding the West’s military presence in the region?

Should the Iranians have a genuine cause for concern? Given the data, you can decide for yourself: There are more than 30 U.S. military installations encircling Iran on all sides, from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the north, to Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan in the southeast, and Afghanistan and Pakistan in the northeast. Just last month there were extensive naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea of U.S., British, French and other nations’ forces.

French Rafale F3 fighter jets carrying the nuclear-tipped ASMP/A missiles trained ‘touch and go’ landing on the USS Harry S. Truman, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; U.S. pilots flew French Super Etendard fighter jets, landing them on the French Charles De Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; French pilots flew U.S. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, landing them on the USS Harry S. Truman.

The U.S. Navy’s deployment near Iran is significant. It includes USS Nassau, an amphibious assault ship carrying AV-8B Harrier attack planes, AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters, CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters and 3,000 U.S. Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The U.S. force also includes USS Mesa Verde, carrying 800 U.S. Marines and USS Ashlan. These warships join the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group, which includes 12 warships. The U.S. naval force is deployed in the Persian Gulf near Chahbahar, not far from the Iran-Pakistan border where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s naval base is located. West of this location, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Strike Group is patrolling.

There were reports that the U.S. was moving 387 bunker-buster bombs, as well as 195 smart Blu-110 bombs and 192 huge 2,000 pound Blu-117 bombs, from California to the U.S. base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, in preparation for a possible attack on Iranian nuclear installations that are deep in the ground and protected by several meters of enforced concrete.

There were reports that Greece allowed Israeli jets to train in its air space, which coincidentally – or not – is the same distance from Israel as Iran, a necessary training should Israel target Iranian nuclear reactors. Other Iranian sources report that Israel has concentrated fighter jets in Azerbaijan, and previously there were persistent rumors that Israel maintains military satellite monitoring equipment in Azerbaijan, and is allowed to run listening devices near the Iranian border and on the shores of the Caspian Sea. Last month, Egypt allowed an Israeli Dolphin nuclear submarine to cross the Suez Canal toward the Persian Gulf.

In parallel, there are reports that a significant number of Iranian tanks and antiaircraft artillery were redeployed near the Iranian border with Azerbaijan and took additional preparations should hostilities break.

One unintended consequence of the massive naval force deployment in the Gulf is the surprise cancellation of the Iranian plan to send a ship with aid to Gaza. Under the U.N. Security Council’s recent resolution, all Iranian ships are subject to stop and search. Perhaps the Iranians planned to stock the ship with more than just bags of flour and rice?

There is no doubt that the U.S.’s and allies’ moves are meant to signal to the Iranians that they mean business. Either the Iranians abandon their nuclear armament plans, or the West will destroy their facilities. In such a showdown, reminiscent of the high noon duel in Hollywood Westerns, the parties must remember – before the situation develops into a full-fledged, regional war – the foreshadowing saying attributed to the Russian playwright Anton Chekhov: “If in the first act you have hung a pistol on the wall, then in the following one it should be fired. Otherwise don’t put it there.”

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 7/12/2010

Is there a humanitarian crisis in Gaza that needs Turkish or Iranian support? Not according to Nicholas D. Kristof of the New York Times, who wrote just last week, “Visiting Gaza persuaded me, to my surprise, that Israel is correct when it denies that there is any full-fledged humanitarian crisis in Gaza.” Based on independent statistics, it seems that perhaps the Gazans should send humanitarian help to the people of Turkey and Iran, not the other way around. An even closer examination of the issue shows that what Gazans desperately need is a political change, not bodily sustenance.

Recently, seemingly compassionate and well meaning individuals and organizations (well, some of them at least) loaded a flotilla of ships bound for Gaza with humanitarian aid for the Palestinians under an Israeli maritime blockade. The ships carried food, medicines and other supplies the organizers thought the Gazans badly needed. (Rockets, explosives and ammunition were left behind. The Gazans have plenty).

Do the Gazans really need the humanitarian cargo? Unlikely. Look at the facts: Although Gaza is probably the densest area in the world, its residents seem to fare much better than the world’s average on many key factors, and definitely better than Iran or Turkey. Let’s start with the basics. Infant mortality: In Iran 35.8 out of 1,000 babies die at birth or during their first year, probably due to poor health care for mother and child. In Turkey the rate is 25.78 dead babies per 1,000 live births. What is the rate in Gaza? 18.35 deaths per 1,000, almost half of the rate in Iran and 30% less than that of Turkey. And how long are the surviving babies expected to live? In Gaza, to age 73.42, in Iran to age 71.14 and in Turkey to age 71.8.

Another relevant indicator is literacy rate, which reflects the country’s investment in education. In Gaza the literacy rate is 91.9%, but in Turkey it’s 88.7% and in Iran only 82.3%.

Interestingly, twice as many Palestinians living in the Palestinian Autonomy in the West Bank live above the poverty line than do their brothers in Gaza. This is likely because of the economic cooperation and almost completely open economic borders between Israel and the Autonomy. Cooperation has its benefits.

Is Gaza a paradise? Hardly. There are poor people, high unemployment and a growing uncertainty regarding the future. But there are also rich people – very rich indeed, like in any other society. In fact, in many respects, the Palestinians in Gaza are better off than their brothers in refugee camps in Lebanon who, for example, cannot even build new houses in the refugee camps under a Lebanese government ban.

Nonetheless, Palestinians in Gaza live in a pressure cooker. Their borders are sealed on all sides, by Israel and by Egypt, which doesn’t want any Islamic Brotherhood supporters from Gaza stirring more violence in Egypt. Hamas’s ideological partners assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Saadat and promise the same fate to his successors. On the other side of the border is Israel, which can’t be expected to feed the mouth that bites it (although much of the world’s media and people with an agenda seem to suggest that it do just this).

If you still wonder why Israel blockades the Gaza Strip and permits only goods that cannot support terror into the area, think of the 8,000 rockets, mortars and missiles that were fired indiscriminately from Gaza on Israeli civilian villages and towns, at a time that no part of the Gaza Strip was held by Israel. Israel’s subsequent 2008 attack on the Gaza Strip in operation Cast Lead significantly reduced the Palestinians’ will to continue shelling Israel.

Israel’s continued blockade is intended to guarantee that additional weapons and ammunition do not enter Gaza, should the Palestinians’ will to attack Israeli civilians ever reemerge. There is also the matter of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier kidnapped from Israeli territory and held hostage by Hamas for the past four years. Has he received humanitarian help? Humanitarian attention maybe? Perhaps allowed a single visit by the Red Cross? Don’t hold your breath. Hamas is not held to any humanitarian standard by the humanitarian aid flotilla organizers.

Is there hope for change in Gaza? Not until Hamas, a designated terror organization, is thrown out of power by the Palestinian people, or until Hamas ceases to be an Iranian agent in the region with a declared intention to destroy Israel. Its Charter spells it out clearly: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”

Palestinians in Gaza don’t need those shipments any more than Iran and Turkey do. The aid the Palestinians actually need from the outside in order to effect long-term change is guidance and help to change their political plight -which brings misery to many – not shipments of bags of flour and rice.

So, why were Turkish and Iranian organizations sending token humanitarian aid to Gaza when their own people are needier? They probably never heard of the Old Jewish Sages’ proverb concerning charity: The poor in your own city come first. However, those sending the flotilla to Gaza certainly listened to the immortal words Mario Puzo wrote for the Mafia Godfather Don Coreleone: “It’s all personal, every bit of business. Every piece of shit every man has to eat every day of his life is personal. They call it business. OK. But it’s personal as hell.”

The conclusion is painfully clear: It’s not a brotherly love for the Palestinians that motivated the Turkish and Iranian organizations and their backers, but their hatred for the Israelis and cynical political maneuvering on the backs of the Palestinians, abandoned by their Islamic brothers for 62 years and counting. Not only the pawn of Hamas, the Palestinians are now being further exploited by the Turks and Iranians.

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 7/06/2010

On May 14, 1876, the New York Times ridiculed the Ottoman Empire, reminding its readers that “It is now some twenty years since we began to hear about the ‘sick man upon the Bosphorus,’ yet the same sort of talk, under somewhat different conditions, is current today. The Ottoman Empire seems to have as many lives as the popular saying attributes to a cat, but seven or eight of those lives must have been already forfeited.” The article, which referred to the Ottoman arrogance and lack of diplomacy in dealing with a Bulgarian insurgency, signaled the beginning of the Ottoman Empire’s end.

The last Sultans ruled as autocrats, oppressing millions. The Empire was notoriously corrupt and their loyal supporters few in number. As self-proclaimed “Successors of the Prophet,” the sultans advocated strict Islamic ideology and pan-Islamism headed by their own supreme authority, thus conflicting with the liberal, secular ideals of the “Young Turk” movement and the West. Recognizing that they could not survive against the invading Russians, who sensed the Empire’s weakness, and minority uprisings from groups like the Armenians, the Ottomans turned to Germany for help. Aligning with the Germans proved fatal; Germany and Turkey lost World War I, the Empire was carved up, and what remained became Turkey under the helm of Atatürk in 1923.

Some 150 years after Turkey’s predecessor was labeled the “Sick Man Upon the Bosphorus,” Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is promoting a policy reminiscent of the years leading to the demise of the Ottoman Empire — choosing the wrong side in a conflict and misreading historical events.

Turkey has changed political course in more than one arena: it is ending a friendly relationship with Israel after decades of maintaining strong mutual military, trade and tourist ties; it put the Russians on guard by entering into a uranium enrichment agreement with Iran; and its relationships with NATO and the U.S. are at all-time lows. Turkey’s hopes of becoming the first Islamic member of the EU were reduced to ashes, and its aspiration to resolve the Cyprus occupation collapsed when Derviş Eroğlu, a Turkish nationalist, was recently elected leader of northern Cyprus. In eastern Turkey, talks with the Kurdish rebels fell apart, and clashes between the Kurds and the Turkish Army ensue.

Although each segment of Turkey’s international policy may seem independently driven, put together they paint a clear picture. Getting a cold shoulder from the West on several fronts, Erdoğan is opting for the warm reception of Iran and other proponents of a pan-Islamism.

This switch in allegiance is not sudden, nor incidental. As close ties with Israel were in place when he took office, Erdoğan leveraged them to “make nice” with Europe and the U.S., hoping to ease Turkey’s admission into the European Union by showing EU members they had no reason to fear an Islamic Turkey. At that point, despite being governed by a leader of the Islamic Party, Erdoğan implied, Turkey showed through its relations with Israel that its religion did not interfere with sober politics. When EU members remained unconvinced, pressuring Turkey to withdraw from northern Cyprus and end its oppression of the Kurds in Eastern Turkey, Erdoğan turned to a more welcoming ally, Islamic Iran.

By marking Israel as the villain, Erdoğan hopes to achieve several strategic goals, the primary being his own political survival. With a parliamentary election forthcoming in November 2011, and a majority win for his party unlikely, Erdoğan needed a rallying cry for unity. Like the 1881 Russian rioters’ outcry following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, “Kill the Jews and Save Russia,” Erdoğan is promoting Islamic solidarity with the Palestinians, much to the chagrin of the Turkish military, a staunchly secular body.

Systematically curtailing the military’s traditional role as protector of secular Turkey, as declared by Atatürk, the creator of modern Turkey, and as made clear in the Constitution, is a well-planned part of Erdoğan’s strategy. That the Turkish military has always advocated strong ties with Israel is yet another reason for Erdoğan to limit its influence, which he did by appointing two radical Muslim civilians to key military and intelligence positions: Hakan Fidan as head of MIT, Turkey’s foreign intelligence service, and Muammer Güler as Undersecretary for Public Order and Security, which heads Turkey’s counterterrorism.

The Turkish-Israeli conflict has now taken on a life of its own, fueled by Erdoğan’s self-imposed role as the champion of Gaza’s Hamas government and ultimate leader of the Islamic world. He will soon discover that it’s a pretty crowded rung, particularly as the Iranians see themselves as sole leaders. In a Turkish-Iranian race for Islamic hegemony, Turkey may find itself losing, and end up with nothing, least of all the West’s support, which Erdoğan is now sacrificing.

The last Sultans of the Ottoman Empire had similar global aspirations. History stands witness to the demise that followed.

This op-ed was originally published in The Huffington Post on 06/16/2010

Germany issued a European arrest warrant for the alleged operative, an Israeli using the name of Uri Brodsky, who is currently being held by the Polish authorities as a result of Berlin’s warrant. He was detained on June 4 at the Warsaw airport, and will be held for up to forty days, during which time the court will have to decide whether to extradite him. The Polish prosecution is calling for extradition, saying the issue is not a diplomatic one.

According to Germany, Mr. Brodsky obtained a German passport via fraudulent means, which was then used by one of the operatives involved in the plot to kill al-Mabhouh. Dubai’s investigation into the killing has identified 32 suspects who travelled into Dubai on fake British, French, German, Irish and Australian passports to kill the Hamas leader. It has been widely reported that the Mossad was responsible for the forgeries and the killing.

Although Dubai Police Chief Lt. Gen. Dahi Khalfan Tamim originally said that Dubai would not be seeking extradition in this case given that the passport fraud occurred in Germany, he has now announced that if Brodsky can be definitively linked to the killing, which occurred in Dubai, then they may request his extradition as well.

Poland – friendly with both Germany and Israel – finds itself in a difficult situation. The Israeli Minister for Tourism is quoted to have said: “Warsaw has to tell Germany that Brodsky, as an Israeli citizen, should be sent to Israel where that country’s legal procedures should be applied.”