WikiLeaks has been strongly criticized for publishing about 77,000 secret U.S. documents in July about the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. Attorney-General Robert McClelland said that the leak, made “from the comfort of an office,” endangered the lives of many soldiers and others who are risking their lives for their countries’ security.

McClelland’s criticism hasn’t exactly discouraged WikiLeaks in its mission to expose clandestine government activity indiscriminately. Indeed, there’s buzz that WikiLeaks intends to publish a second round of sensitive U.S. government documents on October 18, this time about 400,000 documents pertaining to the war in Iraq.

Don’t think anyone’s going to wade through all those documents for golden nuggets of information that could jeopardize U.S. military and intelligence operations overseas? Think again…the world is crawling with terrorists itching to get their hands on every one of those hundreds of thousands of documents.

In fact, the October 18 date of release was leaked by several ex-WikiLeaks members who believe releasing the information so early will have serious repercussions for U.S. collaborators and informants in Iraq, whose covers may be compromised as a result.

On the flip side, how much government cover-up is too much? Topics like Guantanamo, the use of waterboarding and civilian death tolls are along the lines of what WikiLeaks aims to expose. But how selective is WikiLeaks about what it publishes…does the team weigh the potential dangers of releasing each document?

It’s not such a stretch to suggest that Assange – computer programmer, hacker (who got in trouble with the law back home in Australia) and whistleblower – is on the radar of intelligence agencies around the world. Assange certainly thinks so…he keeps his whereabouts on the DL, operates on a ‘need to know’ basis and often believes he is being followed. Indeed, he keeps on the move, never staying in one place for too long. Sounds paranoid, but he might just have good reason to be.

When Attorney General McClelland was asked to confirm rumors that Assange was being tracked by Australian intelligence, and that U.S., Britain and Sweden had access to that information, he responded vaguely, saying that he couldn’t comment, but that the U.S. does in fact cooperate internationally on a number of matters. No kidding!

In Australia, the Defense Signals Directorate, the intelligence agency responsible for SIGINT (signals intelligence) and information security, said formally that they have not been monitoring Assange, but ASIO (like the FBI), ASIS (like the CIA) and the federal police declined to comment on the topic.

So what beans were spilled? Not anything too incriminating…indeed the fact that Hague’s words actually drew the attention of the British press is a testament to how hush-hush these topics have been traditionally.

Bernard Jenkins, the Conservative chairman of the commons public administration select committee was questioning Hague on his foreign policy strategy. Seeing as the UK’s new government has done away with the foreign office’s strategy department, Jenkins wanted to know whether soldiers and spies stationed overseas are now being expected to cobble together their own strategy on the fly.

Hague responded as follows: “No. That is the absolute opposite of what I am saying. The strategy of the country comes from the prime minister, the national security council, the foreign secretary. They have to be the people who think together about this and use every possible source of advice about it, including the advice and the varied opinions of the people who work in their department. So, no, we are not leaving it to the spy in a particular location or the soldier in a particular location.”

Aha…so they do exist!

It has been said that Hague should have offered a ‘no comment’ on intelligence-related topics instead of responding directly to the query about spies, but then again, it’s a little bit ridiculous to continue the charade that British spies don’t exist. Apparently, it’s extremely easy to ‘spot the spy’ in any British embassy, mostly because they think so highly of themselves (à la James Bond). True or not, spies are no secret…most countries have their own network of operatives (though some more extensive than others) stationed around the world…

According to Le Monde Diplomatique, Urim base is located just under 20 miles away from the Beersheva prison, in the Negev desert. The installation quietly, thoroughly and systematically gathers intelligence across the Middle East, Europe, Africa and Asia. With its neatly arranged rows of variously-sized satellite dishes, the base intercepts all means of communications, from phone and email to maritime signals.

The expansive surveillance base, a mile or so north of the Urim kibbutz, is a high-capacity intelligence-gathering hub. The intel gathered therein is used to keep a close watch on governments, organizations, companies and individuals, to monitor the already suspicious and to discover new potential threats. Israel is well-known for the strength of its military, its possession of nuclear weapons and its top notch covert operations, but it is the Urim base that keeps Israel’s ear to the ground, and makes sure that its various security and defense operations are properly informed.

Originally developed decades ago to pick up telephone communications alone (Intelsat), the base’s technology was expanded to intercept maritime communications as well (Inmarsat). It also plugs into other regional satellites, undersea cables and Israeli embassy buildings, creating a network that increases its catchment area. It likely picked up on the communications made by the Gaza ‘aid’ flotilla workers long before the ships began approaching the maritime blockade line.

Of course, gathered data on its own is meaningless – it needs to be deciphered by the analysts over at Unit 8200. In the words of President Obama, the dots need to be connected. Unit 8200 is the body responsible for Israeli signals intelligence. Based in Herzeliya, north of Tel Aviv, Unit 8200 gives meaning to the signals identified at Urim as non-routine, and then passes on the meaningful intelligence to bodies like the military and the Mossad.

Urim targets both enemy and ally nations. With about 30 antennas, it is one of the biggest bases of its kind. Other countries, including the US, the UK and France, have their own bases dedicated to eavesdropping on worldwide communications, but they have been known about for years, whereas Urim has just been discovered…

As per a DEBKAfile exclusive, members of the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) clashed with plain clothes members of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) outside a luxury high-rise building in Northern Tehran’s most exclusive neighborhood, Shaid Babee, or Mini City.

Of course, the Iranian government hushed up the scuffle, given the internal weaknesses and suspicions it gives evidence to. Despite the regime’s best efforts, though, it is becoming well known that the IRGC, who head up Iran’s nuclear program, suspect highly ranked Iranian politicians of selling/trading Iran’s nuclear secrets to Western intelligence agencies, in return for favors. On the flip side, MOIS is furious about the rumors that Ahmadinejad’s nearest and dearest are not absolutely respectful of and faithful to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini.

The events that led to the shoot-out are as follows:

Intelligence Ministry agents helped themselves into the luxury apartment of an IRGC officer. They found bugs and other spy surveillance gadgets hooked up in the apartment as well as in others that they searched in the building. Just as they were leaving, with the items found in hand, they were blocked by men in civilian clothing, who tried to pry the spy devices from them.

MOIS backed up, secluded themselves in the building and called for more agents. However, their back-up was delayed by more men in plain clothes, who had set up a road-block. Shooting ensued and spread, and it is not known how many casualties were caused by the gunfire.

Eventually MOIS identified IRGC as intelligence – both groups had called in for reinforcements – and then MOIS handed over their loot. As if that wasn’t bad enough, it turns out the intricate surveillance system was installed by a different agency altogether – Shahid Fahmideh – that reports to Ayatollah Khameini and the IRGC’s Nuclear Administration.

Looks like within the world of internal Iranian intelligence, no one trusts each other. Each group thinks the other is passing on the secret sauce (nuclear in nature) to the enemy, in exchange for personal interests, influence and power. Of course, these sorts of internal systemic cracks are the last thing Iran wants leaking from its tightly managed, precarious regime.

The Czech Republic, once a Soviet satellite state and now a member of NATO and the European Union, has noted the rise of Russian operatives in its midst. Indeed, last month the counterintelligence agency BIS reported that Russian spies are ever more active, with a focus on the energy sector, and that many can be found amongst academics and students.

The spy story just written about in the Czech daily Mlada Fronta Dnes, however, involved a state-employed Czech psychologist / Russian agent named Robert R., who, through his friendship with a female army major, succeeded in infiltrating the offices of three army generals, to whom the female army major served as head of staff.

The information came from an unrevealed source, and it is unclear whether the female army major knew Robert was a spy, what information she passed to him and whether her leaks threatened national security. Given that military intelligence agents were on the trail of Robert and his cohort for five years, surprisingly little has been revealed to the public about the spy plot.

The three generals involved held the following positions: Head of the President’s Military Office, the Czech Republic’s NATO Rep and the Deputy General for the Chief of Staff. The positions are senior, and indeed, this is the country’s largest reported case of military infiltration. Josef Sedlak, the NATO Rep, spoke up indignantly: “If some information existed showing one of my colleagues was connected to a spy then the agency should have told me to protect me. And not follow me like some villain.”

One of the other generals quit over internal military changes he disagreed with, and the third was not reachable by the newspaper for comment. Meanwhile, the Russian agent has fled back to mother Russia.

Indeed, China is on the verge of passing a law that would require telecommunications and internet companies to track, report and delete potential leaks of state secrets. China is thus seeking to tighten its control over these companies as well as expand its watchful eye by leveraging the companies’ inherent spying capabilities (think China’s cyber attack on the gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists in January).

Although penalties for violations of the new law have not yet been disclosed, the draft law’s definition of ‘state secret’ casts a very wide net, which would undoubtedly be open to government interpretation and abuse. Currently, ‘state secret’ is defined as: “information that concerns state security and interests and, if leaked, would damage state security and interests in the areas of politics, economy and national defense, among others.” The draft is in its third review, which is typically the last before passing into law.

China is home to the biggest population of internet users in the world – a whopping 384 million, but its government isn’t about to lose its grip on the flow of information to, from and among those people. Open communication breeds opinions, which breed dissent and in turn, unrest. The only way to avoid inevitable dissent and unrest, China reasons, is more stringent control and vigilance. Recent restrictions aimed at controlling and limiting information exchange include making it more difficult to register domain names and systematically removing unregistered sites.

At the slightest hint of unrest, China goes into hyper info-control mode, shutting off Twitter and Facebook, unplugging the internet and slowing down other methods of viral communication, like texting, to stem the natural flow of information. This very technique was used last July to stem news of violent ethnic riots breaking out in a Muslim region of western China. To China, twittering about the dissent is just as bad as dissenting, and now they’re going to leverage whatever means necessary – including private sector companies – to expand their spy network.

Google left China last month over censorship and cyber espionage disputes. Which company’s next?

In 1986, he blabbed details and shared photos of Israel’s nuclear weapons program (which Israel neither acknowledges nor denies) to the British media. The British Sunday Times went on to publish the first evidence that Israel had the capacity to make nuclear bombs. Israel was obviously not pleased about the leak, and a Mossad sting subsequently lured Vanunu to Rome, where he was captured and forced to return to Israel by intelligence operatives.

In Israel, the whistleblower was tried and convicted for espionage and treason. He served 18 years in prison, 11 of them in solitary confinement. Released in 2004, he has been taken into custody numerous times since for breaking the terms of his parole, as he did on Monday, by meeting with a Norwegian national in a hotel. He has now been put under house arrest, where he is awaiting an indictment.

According to his lawyer, Vanunu is only interested romantically in the Norwegian woman he met.

Vanunu feels that he’s been mistreated in Israel largely due to his conversion to Christianity. During a recent court hearing, he made a plea to President Obama, with the hopes of being able to live under less scrutiny: “Obama wants a world free of nuclear weapons, and he should push for my release.”

Vanunu’s been campaigning to be allowed to leave Israel, which doesn’t seem like a possibility, given the recent arrest for meeting with a foreigner. While some think that Israel has gone too far with Vanunu (cartoons protesting the length and severity of his punishment abound), Israeli authorities are concerned that he is privy to and will reveal more nuclear secrets, so they’re unlikely to loosen their grip…

But now, the world has yet another – seemingly more concrete – reason to distrust Iran. Published in The Times of London on Monday was a memo apparently leaked from the heart of Iran’s nuclear program, describing the country’s four-year plan to test a neutron initiator, otherwise known as a bomb trigger.

Rest assured, there is no civilian use for a neutron initiator, but of course the Iranians have dismissed the memo as an attempt to frame Iran. In fact, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast referred to the incident as a “scenario” dreamt up by the West.

The documents, whose authenticity and significance the U.S. plans to investigate, apparently includes a note on undercover testing: not only to see if the bomb trigger works but to ensure that whatever traces of uranium are left from the testing are not large enough to be detectable by the examining world.

Although U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley refused to discuss matters of intelligence, he did say, “Iran has yet to really come to… the international community and address our concerns in a meaningful way.”

According to the report in The Times, intelligence agencies dated the memo to early 2007, but the US-based Institute for International Science and Security (ISIS), that was consulted before the piece ran, has cautioned against jumping to conclusions. ISIS believes further document assessment is necessary before the memo can be accurately authenticated, dated and fit into the context of Iran’s nuclear development history.

The timing of the article, though, supports Hillary Clinton’s bid for additional UN sanctions against Iran, and highlights how close Iran is to losing its chance at a diplomatic approach to nuclear and other issues: 2009’s very close to being over…

The reason for Starwood’s distress is clear. Ross Klein, former Starwood executive and instrumental developer of its iconic W brand, left Starwood, joined Hilton to head up the hotel group’s luxury lifestyle brand and subsequently launched Denizen. Starwood alleges that Klein, along with another former Starwood employee turned Hiltonite, Amar Lalvani, stole from Starwood to launch Denizen.

So what does this mean for Hilton? Klein’s off the payroll – he’s been on admin leave since Starwood cried ‘spy!’ and has now officially resigned, to be succeeded by former Miraval Spa (Tucson, Arizona) chief executive. Modification 2 is a name change (Hilton Hotels Corp. to Hilton Worldwide), accompanied by a spiffy new logo to match.

Finally, at the time of writing this post, the Denizen website (www.denizenhotels.com) was no longer accessible.

Seems like Klein may have been a touch too transparent about making use of his transferable skills set at his new job. Perhaps hotel brand developers would also benefit from a crash course at spy school before embracing the world of espionage…

Indeed, Fondren is currently on trial before a jury in a federal court in Alexandria, where the first witness to testify against him was Tai Shen Kuo – the furniture salesman who solicited the goods on U.S.-China military relations from Fondren and subsequently gave the papers he obtained to a Chinese government agent.

Fondren allegedly sold to Kuo 30 reports replete with classified information over the course of a decade (1998-2007; he retired from the Air Force as a lieutenant colonel in 1996). Each paper went for between $800 and $1500.

Kuo has already been convicted of espionage (he pleaded guilty) and is due to serve a sentence of over 15 years. Of course, he’s testifying against Fondren with the hope that he’ll be able to knock some time off of his own sentence.

According to Fondren’s defense lawyer, Asa Hutchinson, Fondren was just one of many victims of Kuo’s conniving ways. Apparently, Kuo told Fondren he was using his ‘opinion papers’ (Fondren reportedly did not hand over verbatim reports but paraphrased and added his own two cents) to further his contacts in the Chinese business community…and Fondren allegedly believed him.

He had no idea Kuo was a spy, said the defense, but Kuo testifies that his cover was extremely flimsy, and that he slipped up several times in such a way that should have left no doubt in Fondren’s mind as to Kuo’s true interest in the military papers. Kuo says Fondren knew the papers’ final destination was the Chinese government, and that he clearly revealed this knowledge in email correspondence with Kuo.

Already this year, Russia has ordered diplomats out of its territory in response to expulsions by NATO and the Ukraine. Russia seems pretty open about its eye-for-an-eye approach – a Russian official told Interfax, the news agency that originally reported the retaliatory expulsion: “This unfriendly act by the Czech side, which declared two of our diplomats persona non grata, could not be left without a response.”

The Russian official also took issue with the fact that news of the Russians’ expulsion from Prague (one was told to pack his bags, the other told not to come back from vacation) was made public. “It is surprising that this information became public knowledge despite the fact that the Czech side itself proposed not to allow any leaks.” The news of the Russian spies appeared online, on Idnes.cz, on Monday.

Russia does not have the best of relationships with its continent-mates at the moment, which is partly due to policies such as swift quid pro quo for any act deemed ‘unfriendly’ to Russia.

Eight of the 10 surrendered themselves to facing the criminal charges the next day, but one ex-intelligence worker who has yet to be taken into custody is the former DAS Deputy Director Jose Miguel Narvaez, who is also being investigated for killings carried out by extremist right-wing death squads.

The 10 former officials have been accused of using their professional positions to carry out illegal activity in the name of national security, when really they were serving selfish interests and infringing on the security of law-abiding citizens. Conviction of criminal conspiracy could get them each 6 years in the slammer…President Uribe and his closest officials of course deny any and all involvement in the alleged espionage, of which there is significant evidence.

There are conflicting opinions on how much Uribe could have known about the extent of the spying. Some say he’s too high up to have known all the details, while others maintain that Uribe is just the sort of President who keeps on top of all the minutia – a real micromanager. They insist it’s not the type of operation to be managed by mid-level officials.

The DAS employees reporting to those officials for whom arrest warrants have been issued were responsible for compiling massive amounts of personal information on target opponents. The files of those spied upon include family snapshots, banking information and personal details like favorite drinks and whether they were cheating on their wives. Sounds like blackmail in the making.

The comprehensive files and the coming forward of some of the DAS employees carrying out the shady grunt work led to the arrest warrants. Although the spy scandal originally came to light in February of this year, the spying had been going on for approximately five years.

pic: AP

In case you were wondering, when we say detailed, we mean detailed. The newspaper report gave not only the names of the 22 suspects, but also their addresses and names of the companies where they are employed. Only three had their pictures in the paper – all middle-aged, but one appeared to have been beaten as his eyes were black and blue in the photograph.

According to the paper, seven of the 22 men have already confessed to spying for Israel, which is what’s been going on since April. Lebanese officials arrest a couple guys, from whom they get some information about other spies, more arrests follow, and of course more information, which leads to more arrests…you get the picture. Since the spy hunt began, 70 people have been arrested, the first few being Lebanese military officials implicated in the 2004 killing of Ghalib Awali, a top Hezbollah commander.

Apparently, those who have chosen to confess over the past few months have revealed Israel’s ultimate goal as the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the destruction of Hezbollah. They say that after the 2006 war with Lebanon, Israel worked hard to significantly expand its espionage networks in Lebanon.

Israel reportedly recruited their agents through job ads and bribes, meeting them either within Lebanon or in Western European countries.

cartoon from tmideast.wordpress.com

Blunders like this are not unheard of – especially in the UK where paparazzi make a veritable sport of peering their cameras over the shoulders of government employees in transit – but releasing sensitive nuclear info on the web for all to peruse seems rather grave.

Not as bad as you’d think, several politicians have assured the U.S. public.

Even though every leaf of the 266-page report is branded across the top in Caps: HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL SAFEGUARDS SENSITIVE, it apparently does not contain any military intel on the location of nuclear weapons or about the methods safeguarding them. Instead, it details the locations that comprise the U.S.’s civilian nuclear holdings (though we’d like to point out that civilian nuclear anything sounds somewhat oxymoronic). This non-military complex, boasting outposts across the nation, does house nuclear reactors and extremely confidential sites at weapons labs.

President Obama  – for some just the name is enough to allay their fears – confirmed the report to be sensitive but not classified, and that the language marking the document as confidential was a precaution taken by inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Steven Aftergood – the Federation of American Scientists security expert who discovered the report online and made note of it in his electronic newsletter Secrecy News – had a slightly different standpoint. He couldn’t understand why the report was public, and called it “a one-stop shop for information on U.S. nuclear programs,” reported the NY Times.

It seems the experts are not exactly in agreement about the severity of the breach.

While John M. Deutch, an MIT  professor and ex-director of central intelligence and deputy secretary of defense, doesn’t think it’s a huge deal (“It’s going further than I would have gone but doesn’t look like a serious breach.”), David Albright, president of a Washington group that monitors nuclear proliferation, says that the info on the location of nuclear fuels contained in the report “can provide thieves or terrorists inside information that can help them seize the material, which is why that kind of data is not given out.”

How the report made it to the Government Printing Office website is still unclear, but the office’s spokesman Gary Somerset said the report had been published “under normal operating procedures.” Hmmm…sounds vague enough to suggest that someone simply messed up. Of course, the review has since been removed from the website.

pics courtesy of comeclean.org.uk and steynian.wordpress.com

Recently, Shin Bet (Israel’s equivalent of the FBI), issued a warning to Israelis telling them to be cautious as there have been attempts by terrorist groups to recruit agents via Facebook and other social networking sites.

Shin Bet reports that there have been several recent incidents in which Arab terrorists have attempted recruiting with direct online contact or by arranging seemingly innocuous meetings with “friends” they make online.

Leaking classified information over the Internet is not brand new, as Shin Bet in the past few years has interrogated and tried numerous Israelis for just this infraction. The security service said in a statement that they “fear classified information may have been leaked, endangering the lives of Israelis who could be enticed to meet abroad with Internet contacts who have offered them deals.”

Apparently, terrorists looking for recruits trawl sites popular with Israelis and aim especially to connect with soldiers who have served with covert units of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

Recently, an Israeli Facebook user was approached online by a man identifying himself only as “a Lebanese agent.” He offered the Israeli money in exchange for classified intel. The Israeli notified Shin Bet and cut off contact with the alleged agent.

Shin Bet has advised Israelis to remove all personal information from their profiles, whether they be on Facebook or other networks. That means no email addresses, phone numbers, mailing addresses or even birth years. Probably not a bad thing for Facebook users in other countries to take heed of as well.

What’s next? Hezbollah following people on Twitter??