As a probable counterweight, the Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, announced on October 6 that four people have been arrested while attempting to conduct subversive activity in one of Iran’s nuclear sites. He accused un-named countries, which, he said, “think that they can use sabotage to hinder nuclear talks with the West.” Salehi provided no further details.

Although some media organizations were quick to describe Mansouri as a spy, it seems that he’s not exactly worthy of the title. He visited Israel three times using his Belgian passport, obtained through marriage to a Belgian national. He rented a hotel room with a balcony facing the American Embassy in Tel Aviv and took photos. He also took photos of the arrival hall at the Ben Gurion airport. These activities could hardly be labeled espionage. So why was Mansouri arrested? Because, legally, it’s not the quality of the intelligence he was gathering but the criminal intent. Otherwise all clumsy spies would get off the hook. The value of the intelligence, if at all, is measured during sentencing. There’s no doubt that Mansouri was a potential risk, and it is credible that he could have posed a serious security risk for Israel.

Mansouri appeared to be using clandestine methods. According to the indictment, he entered Israel three times, each from a different European country. He presented himself to Israelis as a Belgian businessman selling glass for “European Folded Glass System,” probably a shell corporation established by Iranian Intelligence. The indictment further alleges that during his investigation, Mansouri’s handlers instructed him to establish a seemingly legitimate business infrastructure for Iran’s agents to use in espionage and sabotage operations. They also instructed him to seek information about business incorporation, and to survey the local needs for pneumatic tools. According to the indictment, Mansouri, when debriefed by his Iranian handlers, also reported his findings on the passenger screening process at Ben Gurion Airport. The report also alleges Mansouri travelled to a sensitive security installation in Israel and took photos there.

Mansouri was born in Iran. But he spent most of the last 30 years in Turkey and Belgium. He told his Israeli interrogators that when he visited Iran in 2007, he attracted the attention of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence and special operations unit. An Iranian national with a name changed to one that sounded European, a European passport, and with no apparent contact with Iran, could become an intelligence nugget. Mansouri claimed that he was coerced to become a spy. However, judging from the information available publicly thus far, much more credit should be given to the Iranian intelligence services — they are not that stupid or simplistic. Although Mansouri admitted being dispatched by Iran to Israel, his mission could have been a test balloon: testing the Israeli counterintelligence services’ alertness. There’s no need to be a rocket scientist — or ,in this case, an intelligence analyst — to predict that Manouri’s mission was likely to fail. His Belgian passport showed that he was born in Iran. In and by itself, that’s no reason to raise a suspecting brow. But when he came several times to Israel, each time from a different country, suspecting brows went up. One of the first things done under these circumstances is to check the bona fides of the person of interest. This would take just a quick search in the huge databases of the Israeli intelligence community; an inquiry to the Belgian security services for background information; and checking the website used by Mansouri and whether there’s a real company behind it. If the results warranted, he’d be flagged at the border during his next entry, and he’d grow a motorcade tail courtesy of Israeli counterintelligence agents. The rest is just as obvious. He’s arrested; a search of his camera shows photos he took of the American Embassy and the airport; handcuffs; two weeks of interrogation when he spilled out his mission; and soon, an appearance before a Magistrate and indictment.

Why did the Iranians bother? They are much more sophisticated than that. They would never send a professional spy to Israel bearing a passport that gave his birthplace as Iran. A professional spy would not keep incriminating photos in his camera, but would dispatch them and erase the memory card. A spy worthy of his title would establish himself as a law abiding resident; start a business; make contacts; and refrain from any suspicious activities such as taking photos of sensitive areas. Realistically, what intelligence achievements could a tourist with an Iranian accent make during several short visits to security-minded Israel? Identify strategic areas for attack? There’s no need to risk sending an operative. Just watching Israeli TV or reading the newspapers would provide ample information. Incorporating in Israel? Read the website of the Ministry of Justice.

So why was Mansouri sent? One reason could be a security breach on the Iranian end: a suspicion that Israel had planted within the Iranian intelligence services an agent informing Israel of forthcoming espionage operations. To catch the culprit, Iran might plan an operation using a scapegoat that could easily be sacrificed, and make sure that the suspected Israeli agent within their organization — but no one else — was made aware of the operation. If Israel caught the unsuspecting Iranian traveler, then it could lead to the planted Israeli agent in Iran. But Israeli security is sophisticated, too. An Israeli agent planted in Iranian intelligence would scarcely be needed to bring Mansouri to Israel’s attention.

Bottom line: unless this operation was planned by a clumsy and unsupervised Iranian intelligence officer, now behind bars in Tehran, this operation must have had purposes other than traditional espionage.

If true — and the public is unlikely to find out any time soon — then Turkey breached one of the fundamental unwritten rules of ethics in the lawless no-rules game of espionage: do not betray your fellow cooperating intelligence service, because it will haunt you and damage your own interests with all other intelligence services. Turkey’s alleged conduct can be condemned, but understood, because in the cesspool of the covert intelligence war, there are no long-term loyalties, only immediate interests — and Turkey probably had overriding interests strong enough to risk the price it will have to pay for their disloyalty.

Intelligence is traded between countries’ intelligence services just like commodities are traded in the world markets. They trade information for other information or take “a credit slip” for future exchanges.

Although it is common practice among intelligence services to trade information, steps are taken to protect sources and methods used to obtain the information. Rarely are actual secret documents shared for fear that hidden markers would reveal who had original access to the documents. For example: If there are 10 copies of the same intelligence report distributed within a country’s government — each copy has a minuscule change from the others, perhaps just a comma in a different location in the text. Therefore, that risk exists even when redacted documents are sent. Instead, the transferring organization usually prepares a synopsis of the document before it is released to the receiving intelligence organization.

The same elaborate security minded procedures are applied when intelligence agents meet their “assets.” That is particularly true when the meetings are held in countries with suspect loyalty towards the visiting agents’ country. That could have happened with the case at hand. What appears to have happened is that the Israeli Mossad case officers — probably no more than two or three at the time plus back up security — met near the Turkish-Iranian border with their “assets” who had crossed the mountains between the countries. In my fictional intelligence thriller The Chameleon Conspiracy there is a detailed description how a CIA/Mossad agent escaped from Iran to Turkey using the same route. It is not known whether the alleged meeting between the Mossad agents and the “assets” was held with the knowledge of the Turkish intelligence service, Milli Istihbarat Teskilati, or MIT, because Israel could share intelligence, but never operational activities. However, even without MIT’s nod, there’s no doubt that its agents are monitoring the towns nearby the Iranian border, and any strange face gets immediate attention.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the Washington Post’s report; first, whoever leaked them the information, probably a Western intelligence agency, used the credibility of the newspaper to shoot a salvo across the Turkish intelligence agency’s bow: Hey, MIT, you did something that is just not done. And our long organizational memory will teach us to be wary of you next time you want to exchange intelligence information.

Indeed, Turkey immediately protested the article describing it “as part of an attempt to discredit Turkey by foreign powers uncomfortable with its growing influence in the Middle East.”

The second conclusion is that Mossad Israeli case officers preferred not to enter Iran and held face-to-face debriefing rendezvous with their “assets” outside Iran, fearing that any other mode of communication, such as electronic, is less reliable. Who were these assets? Definitely not Israelis, perhaps members of an ethnic minority with an agenda — Kurds, Bahá’í, or Balochs — discriminated Sunni Muslims in Shiite Iran.

In the murky world of international espionage, multiple layers of secrecy, subterfuge and treachery are not the exception. They are the rule.

In addition to the US usage of “laser spying” against the Russians, Nasa technology that has previously been used to detect faint radio signals from space, is now being used to eavesdrop on a room where the curtains are blocking the windows. Using a “horn antenna” this “microwave” technology can blast a wave of energy that is between 30GHZ and !00Ghz through a building wall. If people are speaking inside a room, any flimsy surface, such as clothing will be vibrating, and cause a modulation of the radio beam as it reflects from the surface. It is then amplified and analyzed.

Simpler systems using the planted bug can also use a laser beam to transmit conversations. Such a device was found in the offices of Trinidad & Tobagos’s director of public prosecutions this year.

It has been rumored that Mr. Necas and Ms. Necasova were having an affair, and that she exerted pressure on him to bring about the divorce. Last year Ms. Nagyova first made headlines for receiving hefty bonuses from Necas, who had been previously elected for being “Mr. Clean”. Giggles were abundant when he explained that “she works like a horse.” Subsequently, “Mr. Clean” has admitted to his affair with his chief of staff.

Currently behind bars, Nagyova’s lawyer claims that she acted in good faith to protect the Prime Minister and his wife from scandal. Radka Necasova had “allegedly got in touch with the Jehovah’s Witnesses and began to raise money for gifts…And since Ms. Nagyova didn’t like it and thought it would be good to monitor, she requested surveillance.”

The former chief of staff is also suspected of promising lucrative jobs in state-run companies to three former lawmakers from Necas’ party on condition they quit parliament, and of having contact with entrepreneurs of disrepute.

She faces five years in prison if convicted, in the most extensive anti-corruption operation since the end of Communism. After belligerently reacting to the scandal, and claiming that he would not resign; Mr. Necas was forced to step down.

According to Miroslav Mares, a security expert at Masaryk University in Brno, the corruption that exists between the government and corporate interests has eroded the trust in the Czech government among its allies; including the United States.

“The affair will certainly raise question marks about the trustworthiness of our military intelligence,” Mr. Mares said, “since the intelligence department may have been used for personal reasons that seem to belong in gossip columns.”

Initially, Kiriakou thought he was assisting in an FBI investigation, and only too happy to offer his services. About an hour into the interview he discovered that he was the subject of the investigation.

Previously, Mr. Kiriakou had worked for the CIA for nearly 15 years; first as an analyst and then as an operative. He was stationed undercover in pursuit of Al Qaeda operatives and other terrorist groups. Although he led the team that was responsible for the capture of Abu Zubaydah, an Al Qaeda logistic specialist, along with other militants that were captured in Pakistan, he is best known as the first former CIA operative who in 2007 appeared on numerous cable and network news shows ambivalently discussing waterboarding and other enhanced interrogation techniques as torture and not very effective as an intelligence tool.

Although a varied collection of people including former spies, left-leaning critics of torture, a number of Liberty University (a Christian Right Institution) professors, as well as the famed director Oliver Stone all showed support for Mr. Kiriakou; nevertheless he became the first CIA agent to be convicted of leaking classified material to the media. His supporters found it an outrageous outcome for a man who had risked his life for his country.

It all started when references to Kiriakou’s emails to reporters and human rights’ inquirers containing contact information for other CIA personnel appeared in testimony submitted by defense attorneys for Guantanamo Bay detainees. One of the journalists known as Journalist B, aka Scott Shane, was looking for information about the interrogation of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged architect of the September 11th World Trade Center bombings. Scott Shane already had the name of Deuce Martinez. Mr. Kiriakou confirmed the identity of the CIA contractor to the journalist as the best source for background information; while admitting that he had worked with Mr. Martinez on the Abu Zubaydah case. He emailed Mr. Shane his contact information. The confirmation of Mr. Martinez’ identity is one of the things that the government viewed as illegally disclosing classified information.

Mr. Kiriakou mistakenly believed another agent whose contact information he shared with Journalist A to have retired, and the journalist never used his name. However, the communication was done via email, and Mr. Kiriakou discovered, just as CIA boss General Petraeus was later to discover; that emails, not unlike diamonds, are forever.

Some think that the media attention he received for his opinions caused John Kiriakou to suffer a self-aggrandizement that led to his downfall. Kiriakou said that he was just being helpful.

A new government report concludes that China’s cyber security threat is increasing in sophistication and that its sheer volume “makes China the most threatening actor in cyberspace,”
Although still unknown who is actually exercising the threat, trackers are being helped by technical gains. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission reported to Congress that the culprits are:
1. The People’s Liberation Army
2. Three intelligence and security service ministries.
3. Patriotic hackers conducting espionage out of nationalist fervor.
4. Big IT companies and telecommunications firms.
5. Informal “cyber warfare militia” composed of workers with high-tech day jobs that focus on military communications, electronic warfare, and computer network operations.
6. Criminal hackers conducting industrial espionage for private, state-owned, or government clients.

The report continues “China’s cyber capabilities provide Beijing with an increasingly potent tool to achieve national objectives,” the congressional report states. “In a strategic framework that leans heavily on cyber espionage, a diverse set of Chinese hackers use pilfered information to advance political, economic, and security objectives.”
Chinese embassy officials in Washington routinely deny responsibility for cyber espionage against US targets. A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy wrote in an e-mail responding to a government report last year on cyber spying. “China’s rapid development and prosperity are attributed to its sound national development strategy and the Chinese people’s hard work, as well as China’s ever enhanced economic and trade cooperation with other countries that benefits all, “Willfully making unwarranted accusations against China is irresponsible, and we are against such demonization efforts as firmly as our opposition to any forms of unlawful cyberspace activities.”
The report to Congress points to photos of China’s new J-20 stealth fighter jet and its similarities with Lockheed Martin’s F-22. The photos revived “concerns that human, cyber, or other forms of espionage may have played a role in the J-20’s development.”
The report cites other examples of “malicious Chinese cyber activity” in 2012, including successful attacks on NASA networks and spear phishing e-mails targeting the White House Military Office, which assists in presidential travel and communications.
Until recently, Chinese hackers have long appeared less sophisticated than those in Russia. However in January, a China-based attack targeted the “secure authentication” system of the Defense Department’s Common Access Card standard, one of the Pentagon’s most secure systems.
US military officials testified this year that infiltrating weapons systems, including missiles, aircraft, ships, and ground systems is a Chinese focus. In order to infiltrate computers belonging to India’s Eastern Naval Command, which had no connection to the Internet; Chinese hackers reportedly used compact discs along with thumb drives.
Within the Department of Defense, the US Cyber Command has become fully operational. Beyond that, the White House reportedly issued a secret policy document that outlines what actions the US military can take against cyber attacks.
John Bumgarner, research director for the US Cyber Consequences Unit, a nonprofit security think tank that advises government and industry, has advised “We’re all economic partners, but we’re all on this cyber espionage path where people are routinely breaking in to steal the latest and greatest fighter plane plans. At some point, it may cross the line and become an act of war. In the cyber world, that line is a very blurred line. It’s a path we need to get off.”

.

Mustafa Taleb, in actuality, returned to Israel as his real self, Massoud Bouton, as a result of the decision made by Israel’s Intelligence Unit to end his spy career without compensation because of a disagreement with his bosses.

Bouton’s story is told by a former Shabak (Israel’s Internal Security Service) officer in his newly-released book An Intelligence Agent’s Story. He met with Bouton for hours to gather the details of his life of espionage, which began in 1956 and spanned seven years as he operated in Beirut and Damascus. As Mustafa Taleb, Bouton created a vast network through which he used to collect intelligence. He used a special communication device to relay his information to Tel Aviv. The author wrote this book to clear Bouton’s defamed reputation ensuing from being fired. Bouton died last year.

Public concern arose in 2007 when flying objects hovering above anti-war protesters were reported. Although entomologists claimed that they were actually dragonflies, the U.S. government was accused of secretly developing robotic insect spies. The fact that officials denied the accusations did not end the suspicions. Retired US Air Force Colonel Tom Ehrhard, an expert on unmanned aerial craft, was quoted in the London Daily Telegraph saying, “America can be pretty sneaky.”

In 2008, the US Air Force did unveil undetectable insect-sized spies “as tiny as bumblebees” that they said are capable of flying into buildings to photograph, record, and even attack insurgents and terrorists. With the U.S. military’s record for keeping its technology action to itself, the question remains as to what the reality is regarding the use of lethal mini-drone